Input: Article: The Schnellweg (en: expressway) system, a number of Bundesstraße roads, forms a structure loosely resembling a large ring road together with A2 and A7. The roads are B 3, B 6 and B 65, called Westschnellweg (B6 on the northern part, B3 on the southern part), Messeschnellweg (B3, becomes A37 near Burgdorf, crosses A2, becomes B3 again, changes to B6 at Seelhorster Kreuz, then passes the Hanover fairground as B6 and becomes A37 again before merging into A7) and Südschnellweg (starts out as B65, becomes B3/B6/B65 upon crossing Westschnellweg, then becomes B65 again at Seelhorster Kreuz).

Now answer this question: What road does the Messeschnellweg pass the Hanover fairground as?

Output: B6

Input: Article: Modern Estonia is a fairly ethnically heterogeneous country, but this heterogeneity is not a feature of much of the country as the non-Estonian population is concentrated in two of Estonia's counties. Thirteen of Estonia's 15 counties are over 80% ethnic Estonian, the most homogeneous being Hiiumaa, where Estonians account for 98.4% of the population. In the counties of Harju (including the capital city, Tallinn) and Ida-Viru, however, ethnic Estonians make up 60% and 20% of the population, respectively. Russians make up 25.6% of the total population but account for 36% of the population in Harju county and 70% of the population in Ida-Viru county.

Now answer this question: What percentage accounts for the total number people living in Hiiumaa that are ethnic Estonians?

Output: 98.4%

Input: Article: Mill's empiricism thus held that knowledge of any kind is not from direct experience but an inductive inference from direct experience. The problems other philosophers have had with Mill's position center around the following issues: Firstly, Mill's formulation encounters difficulty when it describes what direct experience is by differentiating only between actual and possible sensations. This misses some key discussion concerning conditions under which such "groups of permanent possibilities of sensation" might exist in the first place. Berkeley put God in that gap; the phenomenalists, including Mill, essentially left the question unanswered. In the end, lacking an acknowledgement of an aspect of "reality" that goes beyond mere "possibilities of sensation", such a position leads to a version of subjective idealism. Questions of how floor beams continue to support a floor while unobserved, how trees continue to grow while unobserved and untouched by human hands, etc., remain unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable in these terms. Secondly, Mill's formulation leaves open the unsettling possibility that the "gap-filling entities are purely possibilities and not actualities at all". Thirdly, Mill's position, by calling mathematics merely another species of inductive inference, misapprehends mathematics. It fails to fully consider the structure and method of mathematical science, the products of which are arrived at through an internally consistent deductive set of procedures which do not, either today or at the time Mill wrote, fall under the agreed meaning of induction.

Now answer this question: What did Mill say might not actually exist?

Output:
gap-filling entities